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The algorithmic panopticon at Deliveroo: 




Deliveroo is a food delivery platform that allows customers to order food from 
restaurants and have it delivered via a smartphone app. It uses a similar business 
model to Uber, effectively outsourcing the costs and risks of the operation onto 
workers. New platforms like these utilise digital surveillance to measure and control 
workers through their smartphones. Although algorithms have become a popular 
topic of research, less is known about how these are experienced by workers and 
how effective they are at overcoming the indeterminacy of the labour process at 
work. This article draws on a workers’ inquiry methodology – including observation, 
interviewing, and co-research – to explore these questions from the perspective of 
the worker. It traces the development of supervision, from the panopticon in the 
factory, to the electronic panopticon in the call centre, and applies this as the 
algorithmic panopticon at Deliveroo. The analysis highlights how this managerial 
technique relies upon illusions of control and freedom, drawing attention to the 
double precarity present for both the workers and the platform. 
Introduction 
Deliveroo is a platform for food delivery, using the model of Uber, which has 
become the archetypal example of this kind of organisation. Platforms have 
grown rapidly in recent years, something captured in the refrain for new 
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companies that they will be the ‘Uber for X’ (Srnicek, 2017: 37). Like Uber, 
Deliveroo is pitched as a platform that connects customers with food and the 
riders to deliver it. Deliveroo can therefore be considered as the ‘Uber for 
food delivery’, despite the fact it also competes with Uber’s own UberEats 
offering. It has become a major part of the so-called ‘gig economy’ in 
London, in which work is becoming increasingly fractured across different 
gigs – or precarious work arrangements. Deliveroo is ‘disrupting’ the food 
delivery sector, to use the parlance of these companies. In the words of 
Deliveroo (2017), it connects ‘hundreds of restaurant chains and many top 
quality independents to deliver their food’ with ‘a fantastic team of drivers.’ 
The platform aspect relates to the fact that Deliveroo classifies the drivers as 
‘self-employed independent contractors’, claiming that they bring together 
the restaurants and drivers rather than directly employing anyone. This is 
similar to Uber’s claim to be a taxi company that employs no drivers, nor 
owns any cars.  
The aim of this article is to intervene in the debates around the use of 
algorithms in platform work. There is an increasing output of research on 
algorithms (Schneier, 2015; Cheney-Lippold, 2017; O’Neil, 2017; Turow, 
2017; Eubanks, 2018), but less focus on how they are used in practice as 
forms of ‘algorithmic management’ (Lee et al., 2015; Rosenblatt and Stark, 
2016). At Deliveroo, algorithms are used to measure and supervise work. 
However, as comparatively little is known about how these work in practice, 
there is risk of overstating the power and sophistication of these techniques. 
This paper will address the use of algorithms at Deliveroo through an 
updated version of the panopticon metaphor. In order to do this, the 
development of different forms of measurement and supervision are traced 
from the factory and call centre. These two examples highlight how the 
techniques have developed, both in terms of the new methods, but also 
exploring what the loss of a human supervisor – either walking the factory 
floors or listening in the call centre – means for management at Deliveroo.  
The contribution of this article is an intervention into the debates on 
platform work and the role of measurement, surveillance, and control. The 
intention is to highlight how the algorithm operates at Deliveroo by starting 
from the perspective of the worker on the platform. To do this, the article 
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uses the workers’ inquiry as a methodological approach, drawing on 
observation, interviews, and elements of co-research. The findings also 
reveal how algorithmic management is experienced by workers, along with a 
two-fold expression of precarity at Deliveroo – both for workers and the 
platform. This is discussed in terms of Deliveroo’s need for an illusion of 
managerial control, albeit backed up detailed supervision and the occasional 
disciplinary act. The appearance of an omnipresent and automatic method of 
supervising and disciplining workers is a cost-effective method of control, 
but, as the participants show in this paper, this appearance was far from 
total.  
Measurement at work 
The factory 
The measurement of work is a core concern for management, clearly 
identifiable in the factory regime. The management of work involves the 
buying of people’s time and then its effective use. The capitalist work 
relation is premised on the existence of what Marx (1976: 272) joked were 
workers who are ‘free in a double sense’. This meant workers that are free to 
choose who they sell their time to, but also freed from any other way to 
make a living. The problem here, and one which managers have long been 
concerned with (as well as labour process theorists from the other side), is 
the contradiction between the interests of the seller of labour power (the 
worker) and the buyer (the capitalist). In chapter ten of Capital, Marx (1976) 
explores this through the tensions over the length of the working day. In the 
context of the factory, the capitalist seeks to increase their profits through 
increasing the extraction of surplus value from workers. Marx explores how 
the lengthening of the working day achieves this, increasing the absolute 
surplus value produced. However, this method results in marginal returns, as 
it exhausts workers in the process of lengthening the shifts. Instead of 
making the absolute period of work longer, relative surplus value can be 
increased by making workers produce more during the same period of time. 
Both of these are attempts to solve the indeterminacy of labour power (how 
to get the most out of purchased labour power), but increasing relative 
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surplus value has been the most effective. However, achieving this is 
complicated in practice because it entails exerting control over workers. As 
Edwards (1979: 12) has argued, ‘control is rendered problematic because 
unlike the other commodities involved in production, labor power is always 
embodied in people, who have their own interests and needs and who retain 
their power to resist being treated like a commodity’. 
In the factory, the measurement of worker performance therefore became an 
important starting point for increasing profits. Systematic measurement of 
the labour process became an obsession for Taylor (1967: 36), who argued 
that ‘managers assume’ the ‘burden of gathering together all of the 
traditional knowledge which in the past has been possessed by the workmen 
and then the classifying, tabulating, and reducing this knowledge to rules, 
laws, and formulae.’ While studying work at the Midvale Steel company, 
Taylor developed a close knowledge of production, breaking down and 
measuring each aspect. Scientific management (or Taylorism as it became 
known) developed into a method with three principles. First, the ‘gathering 
and development of knowledge of the labour process’, which entails detailed 
measurement of the work. Second, ‘the concentration of this knowledge as 
the exclusive province of management’. Third, the ‘use of this monopoly 
over knowledge to control each step of the labor process and its mode of 
execution’ (Braverman, 1999: 82). These three principles, along with the 
prevalence of time and motion studies, went beyond just measurement to 
become what Braverman (1999: 60) has argued is ‘a theory which is nothing 
less than the explicit verbalization of the capitalist mode of production’.  
Measurement is therefore a key part of managing the labour process. It 
provides the basis for managers to address the indeterminacy of labour 
power, ensuring that purchased labour power is being used effectively. In the 
factory, this required supervisors who would walk ‘up and down the central 
isle of the workshop’ carrying out ‘a supervision that was both general and 
individual’ (Foucault, 1991: 145). This process turned the factory into a 
workplace of surveillance, measuring the work through direct supervision to 
ensure workers were expending maximum effort. However, the general 
aspect of supervision is also one of threat – after all, the supervisor cannot 
watch every worker simultaneously. This aspect of supervision is often 
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discussed through the metaphor of the panopticon, which was an 
architectural model of a prison in which a single observer could 
simultaneously watch each prisoner from a central point. The panopticon 
was intended to internalise the supervisory function, as the individual 
prisoner cannot know when the observer is watching and so assumes it could 
happen at any point. While Bentham (1995: 80) discussed the utility of this 
in prisons, he also argued that ‘whatever be the manufacture, the utility of 
the principle is obvious and incontestable, in all cases where the workmen 
are paid according to their time’. He foresaw how the panopticon could also 
be a tool to overcome the indeterminacy of labour power. However, Bentham 
also continued to argue that where workers are ‘paid by the piece’, the 
‘interest which the [worker] has in the value of [their] work supersedes the 
use of coercion, and of every expedient calculated to give force to it’. 
Therefore, the subordination of workers increasingly used piece-rates in 
production alongside supervision. Both involve attempts to make workers 
internalise management’s aims. 
Piece-rates provide a powerful tool for managers to encourage greater 
productivity. If management became obsessed with finding ways to increase 
productivity, Burawoy (1979) instead looked at why workers worked as hard 
as they did. In the study, he found workers used game-like practices to ‘make 
out’ and surpass expected work quotas. The piece-rate approach became 
successful and, as Cliff (1970) has argued, about two-fifths of the working 
class were covered by piece-work systems before 1970 in the UK. However, 
the piece-rate system – along with strong shop-steward networks – provided 
multiple avenues for workers to effectively resist management. In response 
to working class militancy, these were increasingly replaced by ‘productivity 
deals’, with workers agreeing to work for a higher wage and not restrict 
productivity measures. This meant again developing new ways to control 
workers, no longer relying on a straightforward financial incentive. 
The call centre 
The next key development of managerial control comes after the decline of 
manufacturing in the UK. Across the global north, this restructuring has 
meant that most people now work in services. What sets services apart from 
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factory work are four main characteristics: intangibility, variability, 
perishability of output, and simultaneity of consumption and production 
(Lovelock, 1983). This creates new challenges for management ‘because 
services are more intangible than not, quality and productivity are difficult 
to measure’, which means ‘it is difficult to set specific goals for employees 
and evaluate their performance based on those goals’ (Batt, 2008: 434). One 
way to overcome this has been to apply new kinds of technology to the 
labour process in service work. Despite the early claims to the contrary, this 
has led to a kind of post-industrial work that Brophy (2010: 474) has 
described as ‘not Daniel Bell’s dream, but Harry Braverman’s nightmare’.  
The call centre became symbolic of many of these changes, as well as 
becoming the focus of many debates on measurement, surveillance, and 
control. As Glucksmann (2004: 795) summarised, call centres are ‘one of the 
most researched’ forms of contemporary work, providing ‘material for 
debates about “surveillance versus resistance”, work degradation and the 
relevance of an electronic panopticon analogy’. This focused on how 
‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 2012) was being organised in call centres 
(Mulholland, 2002; Houlihan, 2002; Kolinko, 2002, Taylor and Bain, 2003). 
This qualitative aspect of the labour process is difficult to quantify and 
measure, due to its subjective and ephemeral characteristics. Taylor and 
Bain (1999: 103) therefore conceptualised the demand for call centre 
workers to ‘smile down the phone’ within a workplace marked by ‘extreme 
levels of surveillance, monitoring and speed-up’ (Taylor and Bain 1999: 108).  
Facilitated by digital technology, the call centre became a site in which the 
measurement of the labour process could be timed to the second (Woodcock, 
2017). In this context, Foucault’s (1991) use of the panopticon metaphor was 
developed by Fernie and Metcalf (1997: 3) to claim that call centres were 
organised like an ‘electronic panopticon’. They argued and that the 
‘possibilities for monitoring behaviour and measuring output are amazing to 
behold’ and that ‘the “tyranny of the assembly line” is but a Sunday school 
picnic compared with the control that management can exercise in computer 
telephony’. The use of this metaphor has faced criticism, for example 
McKinlay and Taylor (1998: 175) argued that ‘the factory and the office are 
neither prison nor asylum, their social architectures never those of the total 
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institution’. Similarly, Taylor and Bain (1999: 103) point out that this 
comparison can ‘disavow the possibilities for collective organisation and 
resistance’, and that in call centres, management ‘rely on a combination of 
technologically driven measurements and human supervisors’ (Taylor and 
Bain 1999: 108). After all, the workplace involves contradictions between 
quantity and quality of phone calls in the labour process (Bain et al., 2002: 3) 
and necessarily entails the ‘dynamic process of capital accumulation’ (Taylor 
and Bain 1999: 108). Yet it is possible to use the panopticon metaphor to 
illustrate the new dynamics of supervision while still drawing attention to 
the resistance that takes place on the call centre floor (Woodcock, 2017). 
The platform 
These previous debates about factory work and call centres provide an 
important route into understanding the role of measurement in platform 
work. The same concern over the indeterminacy of labour power in the 
factory and the call centre remains, although now platforms are purchasing 
slivers of worker’s time, spread out over a geographic range that is 
potentially global. As Standing (2016) has predicted, one third of labour 
transaction will take place on digital platforms by 2025. The ‘integration’ of 
telephones and computers in the call centre that facilitated the 
intensification of measurement (Taylor and Bain, 1999: 102) is now 
reconfigured, with workers expected to pay for their own smartphones 
equipped with GPS for far more granular data collection.  
The growth of platforms like Deliveroo and Uber has been analysed by Nick 
Srnicek (2017: 91). He identifies the ‘lean platform economy’ as emerging 
from a contect in which it ‘ultimately appears as an outlet for surplus capital 
in an era of ultra-low interest rates and dire investment opportunities rather 
than the vanguard destined to revive capitalism’. Trebor Scholz (2017: 13) 
has also undertaken a sustained critique of platforms, arguing that they have 
been ‘instrumental in the process of dissolving direct employment, thereby 
creating low-wage futures for millions of people’. Scholz (2017: 42) argues 
that platforms like Deliveroo are, in fact, ‘a labor company, not simply a tech 
startup, which means it is reliant on the availability of an abundance of 
cheap labor and a permissive regulatory environment’ (Scholz, 2017: 44). 
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While there are a range of different forms of platforms, delivery platforms 
are a kind of ‘geographically-sticky’ work (Graham and Woodcock, 2018: 
245) that requires workers to be in a particular place to complete the work. 
This is distinguishable from forms of ‘cloud work’ that workers can complete 
from anywhere with a computer and internet connection, either short tasks 
like ‘crowdwork’ or larger ‘freelance’ activities. Deliveroo is therefore a kind 
of ‘location-specific labour platform’ (Graham and Woodcock, 2018: 245). 
The key way that platforms like Deliveroo have sought to manage labour is 
through the use of algorithms. Algorithms involves ‘sets of defined steps 
structured to process instructions/data to produce an output’ (Kitchin, 2017: 
14), often automating previous ways of doing things. The processes involved 
are often obscured as if they operate like a ‘black box’ (Pasquale, 2015), 
making research challenging. Kitchin (2017: 22-25) has suggested six 
different ways forward for researching algorithms. The first four involve 
directly engaging with the algorithm, either through the ‘pseudo-
code/source code’, ‘reflexively producing code’, ‘reverse engineering’, or by 
‘interviewing designers or conducting an ethnography of a code teaming.’ 
However, by positioning the algorithmic management as a development of 
previous management techniques in the factory and then the call centres, 
platforms can also be considered in two other ways: either by ‘unpacking the 
full socio-technical assemblage of algorithms’ – although this is clearly very 
difficult to undertake in a single short case study – or by ‘examining how 
algorithms do work in the world’ (Kitchin, 2017: 25). Thus, following the 
worker and the algorithm into what Marx (1976: 280) described as ‘the 
hidden abode of production’ provides a way to explore this in practice. This 
must start from an understanding of the workplace as a site of conflict in 
which algorithms are designed and implemented by management. The 
algorithm, and of course the measurement necessary for it to be effective, 
are therefore part of a longer history of management at work, a process that 
necessarily involves attempts to supervise, control, motivate, and discipline 
workers.  
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Research methods  
There are significant challenges for researching work at Deliveroo as it is 
mediated via a digital platform. The organisation of work limits the 
opportunities for accessing workers, as there is nothing analogous to the 
factory gates. There is no physical point outside the workplace at the start or 
end of a shift to speak to workers. As with other kinds of precarious work, 
there are structural access problems, and the company itself is not open to 
research. To address this, the article draws on an ongoing research project 
that has experimented with different methods to overcome these barriers. It 
began in June 2016 in London, before the first strike at Deliveroo in August 
that year (see Woodcock, 2016). This project is an attempt to apply the 
method of workers’ inquiry (Marx, 1938), which has been covered in previous 
issues of both ephemera (Woodcock, 2014) and Viewpoint (Woodcock, 2013). 
It began through serendipitous contact with a Deliveroo driver, along with 
noticing a rapidly growing number of workers appearing on the roads of 
London. In Workerist terms, despite the initial contact with a Deliveroo 
driver, the project began as an ‘inquiry from above’ (Rieser 2001: 4), seeking 
to gain access to the workplace. This involved ‘participatory’ methods, 
ethnographic observations, and conversations with workers (Alberti, 2014) 
which were documented with ‘full field-notes’ throughout the project 
(Lofland and Lofland, 1995). These were supplemented with ten semi-
structured interviews, which were recorded and transcribed. The researcher’s 
identity and the aims of the project were disclosed to both the interview 
participants, as well as the workers who were engaged in informal 
conversations. All of the interviews have been anonymised using 
pseudonyms to protect the identity of the participants. This is particularly 
important as Deliveroo have previously victimised workers for speaking 
publicly about the company (Geraghty, 2016). 
The extended contact with Deliveroo workers allowed the utilisation of 
snowball sampling for the semi-structured interviews, which Hagan et al. 
(2011: 157) have noted is ‘a commonly used strategy for locating hard-to-
find or sensitive population’. This was a deliberative approach to sampling, 
seeking out further contacts from those encountered during the observation. 
The interviews themselves were difficult to organise, despite initial interest 
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from potential interviewees. Due to the shift patterns of the work, it proved 
difficult to reliably schedule interviews. When the interviews were 
scheduled, they took place across London. Each was recorded, and informed 
consent was achieved with each participant. In total there were ten formal 
interviews which were transcribed, along with field notes for the other 
conversations and participatory activities. Eight of the interviews were with 
bicycle riders, while the other two were with moped/motorcycle drivers. Half 
of the interviews were with migrant workers, mainly from EU countries. The 
age range was relatively narrow, with participants in their 20s, and all of the 
participants were men.  
To supplement these methods, the project also attempted a collaborative 
form of ‘co-research’ (Rieser, 2001: 1). This involved two main activities. 
First, co-writing an article with a Deliveroo rider, who used the pseudonym 
Facility Waters (Waters and Woodcock, 2017). This process was carried out 
over six months. It involved Waters self-tracking their routes across London, 
taking detailed information and pictures about each step of the labour 
process, and analysing their own experiences in depth. It began as a form of 
co-writing termed ‘the full fountain pen method’ (Worcester 1995: 125) that 
the Johnson-Forest Tendency developed, but the final paper was mostly 
written by Waters, with myself becoming more of an editor. The results of 
this paper are drawn upon here both directly (with some quotation from 
Waters in the article) and indirectly. The second part was a collaboration 
with the IWGB (the Independent Workers’ Union of Great Britain). The 
workers involved in the strike approached the IWGB and began organising 
with them afterwards. I observed these early meetings and provided 
volunteer support in various ways to facilitate access.  
Informal conversations were conducted with workers during the later 
organising campaign in London. Many of these conversations were 
conducted during the organising drive in a north London zone, which 
involved speaking to people based in that zone, but also activists who had 
travelled over from other areas to leaflet for the union campaign. Due to the 
nature of the activities, there were burst of activity as drivers arrived at peak 
times, followed by relative lulls that provided ample time to talk. Given the 
conditions in which these conversations were had – on the side of the road, 
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often interrupted, and partly in the rain – it was not possible to record these, 
although for fourteen, field notes were taken as soon as possible afterwards. 
However, despite these constraints, it was possible to discuss the issues of 
algorithmic management and resistance with workers, adding additional 
data to the formal interviews. 
This collaboration was overt from the very beginning, with the position of 
the researcher made explicit throughout. It mainly involved observation and 
informal interviews, but I also volunteered to help union activists with the 
creation, dissemination, and analysis of an online survey of work conditions 
in the gig economy. This involved a combination of closed questions about 
features of the work, along with open questions to solicit testimonials from 
workers. The survey was conducted online and distributed via existing 
WhatsApp networks of riders and through the organising campaign in 
London, resulting in 158 responses. Further details can be found in 
parliamentary select committee submission (IWGB Couriers & Logistics 
Branch, 2017). In return for assisting with the research, it was agreed that 
the statistics could be used for this article, and the initial findings of the 
data is drawn upon here to add an overview of the conditions in this kind of 
work. The connection between knowledge production and organising has 
always been a critical component of workers’ inquiry as a method, setting it 
apart from more traditional methods. As Burawoy (1988) has argued, 
engagement and intervention can indeed be a valid part of the research 
process. The project therefore aimed to create a ‘participative communit[y] 
of inquiry’, collaborating with Deliveroo workers in a form of ‘co-research’ 
(Reason and Bradbury, 2008: 1) in order to move from an inquiry ‘from 
above’ towards and inquiry ‘from below’ (Rieser, 2001: 4).  
Working for Deliveroo 
How Deliveroo works 
Working for Deliveroo starts with a short ‘onboarding’ process. For example, 
as one driver, Alejandro explained, ‘I apply on the internet and that’s it, they 
send me a text “can you come tomorrow to have a quick interview”, ask me a 
few questions, a trial with the bicycle, twenty minutes of cycling around and 
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that’s it’. The speed of the process was much quicker than applying for other 
kinds of service work, although it was comparable, as Fred noted, to getting 
work in a call centre – another industry marked by high demand for workers. 
The ‘onboarding’ process took place at physical location shared with the 
company’s call centre. Once the initial assessment was complete, a 
representative from the company would take the prospective worker’s phone 
and download the app, then the worker queues for the Deliveroo branded 
clothes and backpack. This contact with Deliveroo is the first and only 
physical interaction, and the company representatives (like the call centre 
workers that they meet at this point) are also on precarious contracts. 
The delivery workforce at Deliveroo is divided into two parts. The first are 
the moped or motorbike drivers, who work throughout the day and evening. 
As Mostafa explained, drivers tended to work ‘six days or more, around 
eleven hours a day is common’. This meant that Deliveroo would be the 
main source of income. These workers were primarily migrants, with large 
numbers of workers from Brazil, the Indian subcontinent, and eastern 
Europe. The second are the cyclists, who work a shorter shift pattern over 
lunch and the evening, helping to meet peak demand over mealtimes. For 
many of the cyclists, this was often fitted around other kinds of work, like 
Tim who worked ‘in the evenings after my other job’, and Fred who also 
worked in a book shop. There are similarities here with other kinds of 
platform work, with the income being used to supplement other forms of low 
paid work, particularly given the high cost of living in London.  
The first key difference with other service industry work is that there is no 
formal employment contract for drivers. Deliveroo, like Uber, uses the 
controversial ‘self-employed independent contractor’ (rather than employee 
or worker status), which is in the process of being challenged (Rogers, 2016; 
Aloisi, 2016). The survey conducted with Deliveroo drivers and the IWGB 
illustrates some of the problems with this independent contractor status. 
Notably, 87.1 percent of the respondents did not think that the status 
accurately reflects the nature of their work, with 47.6 percent believing they 
should be categorised as ‘employee’ and 43.5 percent as ‘worker’. In addition 
to this disagreement with employment status, an overwhelming 97.8 percent 
wanted an increase in employment rights – including ‘access to pensions, 
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parental leave, holiday pay, and sick pay’. In particular, 95.7 percent of 
respondents thought that the company should be responsible for providing 
specific measures for safety at work, including paying for insurance and 
providing adequate training. These figures demonstrate serious issues at 
Deliveroo. The clearest examples of this is that 92 percent felt the 
classification as ‘self-employed’ resulted in them ‘being treated unfairly 
compared to an employee’ and that ‘employers deliberately misuse the “self-
employed” category to take advantage of their workers’. The results of the 
survey highlighted that these workers were not content with the current 
contract status. 
The ‘self-employed independent contractor’ status affected the experience 
of working at Deliveroo. As Conor noted, this meant that ‘technically I can 
get anyone else to fill in for my shift’, but that would mean ‘I’d have to give 
them my phone to get the orders, and I’m not going to do that, who would 
give their phone over to someone else!’. Rather than taking advantage of 
this option – which was arguably only included to support the self-employed 
status – the lack of employment security was keenly felt by all the 
participants. As Steve explained, ‘it’s not even like you’ll get sacked working 
here, you just get “deactivated”, that’s it just a message, a notification’. In 
light of this, Kendrick explained he would ‘rather have something with more 
security’ and was ‘actively looking for something else’. 
This experience is a form of precarity at work – both in terms of the 
conditions of the work and the subjective experience of the insecurity. 
Precarity, ‘as a concept’, is ‘both more unwieldy and indeterminate than 
most’. As Mitropoulos (2005: 12) argues, if anything can be said ‘for certain 
about precariousness, it is that it teeters’, which points towards ‘some of the 
tensions that shadow much of the discussion about precarious labour’. 
Bourdieu (1998: 95-9) has provided a useful definition of ‘précarité’ as a 
‘new mode of domination in public life… based on the creation of 
generalized and permanent state of insecurity aimed at forcing workers into 
submission, into the acceptance of exploitation’. This experience of 
precarity is present at Deliveroo, compounded by the lack of physical contact 
with other workers and management. For example, Fred talked about the 
difference with working in a ‘call centre’ as ‘its a workplace you can see like 
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the amount of people within like a week that would be gone but with 
Deliveroo it’s much harder to tell…you don’t have any physical contact with 
Deliveroo’. This is again like Uber, as after the ‘onboarding’ there is no 
reason why there would be physical contact with supervisors or 
representatives of the company. However, unlike Uber, Deliveroo workers 
meet at ‘zone centres’ and can form offline connections with other workers 
(Waters and Woodcock, 2017). As Leonardo explained, ‘Deliveroo tell us 
where to wait between orders, so you know, we meet each other, that’s how I 
got on the WhatsApp group too’. For Steve, the meeting points played an 
important role, as ‘you get to chat away, talk about what’s happening and 
meet other people doing the same thing’. Despite these collective moments 
between deliveries, Alejandro remarked that ‘I feel alone with the company, 
you feel like you are a self-employed because you don’t have bosses but at 
the same time Deliveroo is your boss, you can’t see anybody but you work for 
a company’.  
The precarity and risk led Alejandro to highlight that he ‘feels scared 
sometimes… If I have an accident it’s my problem, the company only care 
about you if you deliver the order and that’s it. I feel less secure absolutely’. 
The risk of accidents while making deliveries was a strikingly common 
theme. There were numerous stories of drivers or riders who had accidents 
while on a shift, receiving no assistance from Deliveroo, other than 
suspending their account while they could not work. Mumit had a crash 
while on his motorbike and received no help. Similarly, after this, he left his 
motorbike for ‘three minutes… standard delivery, came back down, bike was 
gone’. Following the theft, he also received no support: 
Deliveroo don’t care, it’s got nothing to do with them, because you’re an 
independent contractor so you have to deal with your own things, they don’t 
care, they’ll sign you off for the shift until you can get back, they’ll say get 
back in touch with us and that’s all through the call centre as well, not 
through a person who’s…even pretending to give a fuck [laughter]. 
In Mumit’s estimation, ‘across the whole of London every day, at least one 
Deliveroo motorcycle gets stolen, if not two or three, and I imagine the 
bicycle rate is a lot higher’. This represents a significant extra cost for 
drivers, whether the cost of a new bicycle or ‘thousands of pounds to get a 
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[motor]bike’. The process of contractual outsourcing (through the self-
employed independent contractor status) frees Deliveroo from the risks of 
much of the work, meaning they do not even need to measure the extent of 
these losses. For workers, this compounds the sense of precarity, not only 
through the unstable relationship with Deliveroo, but the additional risks 
from cycling or driving around the city. 
Measurement at Deliveroo 
The measurement of work at Deliveroo begins when the driver enters their 
‘zone’. London is divided into multiple zones that carve up the city. Once 
entering the zone – after the unpaid drive from home to there – the worker 
can activate the smartphone app and log in. Within this is a ‘zone centre’. 
This is an algorithmically determined meeting point, designed as a waiting 
area with the shortest possible routes for deliveries. This is a key difference 
to Uber, with drivers not being given directions between taxi journeys, other 
than the nudge of surge pricing. Example screenshots of each step of the 
labour process can be found in the co-written article (Waters and Woodcock, 
2017). 
The information asymmetry between the platform and the worker is 
particularly notable at Deliveroo. The platform has a real-time knowledge of 
each worker, measuring GPS positioning and timing, whereas the worker is 
only given enough information to complete the next part of the task. Once 
an order has been made, it is then pushed out via the app to a worker, a 
process determined algorithmically. The individual worker chosen by the 
algorithm is only given the option to accept the delivery – although they can 
be skipped by ignoring the notification. This is believed to negatively affect 
the workers rating, but as Facility explained ‘we rarely receive any official 
clarification, and largely rely on sharing information and experiences 
between workers’ (Waters and Woodcock, 2017). Despite the claim that 
these workers are self-employed, they are only given just enough 
information at each step. The first instruction is which restaurant the food 
needs to be picked up from, with no information about the following 
journey. This means workers cannot skip a delivery with a long or 
complicated route, in favour of making shorter journeys to maximise their 
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pay. The app screen displays the restaurant location and then moves into a 
GPS guide route. On arrival at the restaurant, the worker confirms this 
through the app and is given instructions, which can involve entering the 
restaurant via a back door to collect food. The worker is then expected to 
check what they are picking up, but the focus here is the order number to be 
exchanged. In some cases, the worker can be informed that they are doing a 
‘stacked order’, picking up more than one order from a restaurant, again not 
given a choice through the app to refuse this. 
Once the order has been received from the restaurant, a new swipe on the 
app provides the worker with the address of the customer. The app then 
switches to the GPS route. After the journey – which can differ greatly in 
length across the zone – the worker arrives at the customer’s address, hands 
over the food, and confirms the delivery on the app. The customer 
interaction is limited to the handing over of the food, perhaps with some 
brief pleasantries. Unlike Uber, the customer does not rate the quality of the 
interaction. There is the option for the customer to add a tip through the 
app, although this can only be added at the point the customer orders the 
food. Therefore, the customer does not have an opportunity to measure the 
workers performance – either in terms of speed of the delivery or quality of 
the doorstep interaction – before making a choice about whether or how 
much to tip. As Conor explained, ‘you find out about the tips after you do 
the deliveries, I save them up until the end of the shift to open them like 
scratch cards’. Following a delivery, workers are ordered back to the ‘zone 
centre’ to wait for the next delivery. Through the app, workers are given 
each task step-by-step. Echoing Taylor (1967: 3), the app ‘specifies not only 
what is to be done, but how it is to be done and the exact time allowed for 
doing it’. 
Workers, at least at the point I conducted interviews, were assigned shifts to 
log in. However, despite the ability for Deliveroo to know exactly when a 
worker starts or ends a shift, the interviewees noted that often they would 
start earlier and finish later. For example, Facility (Waters and Woodcock, 
2017) would often start before their assigned shift because: 
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I have logged on early and been paid my hourly rate regardless of when I was 
officially down to do so. Sometimes this works, sometimes it does not. While I 
am certain there are specific criterion that Deliveroo payroll are using, I have 
no certainty of what these actually are. The other riders and I have our 
superstitions, but very little concrete knowledge. 
Similarly, shifts would often be extended if the worker took a delivery that 
could not be completed in the remaining time. Although technically workers 
could call ‘Rider Support’ to be unassigned, ‘the line gets jammed at 9:30pm 
as so many people are doing this, so being on hold takes just as long as 
delivering the food. And if you deliver the food you get the pay, so it is just 
not worth the hassle’ (Waters and Woodcock, 2017). However, this dynamic 
later began to disappear, as Deliveroo moved from a pay arrangement with 
an hourly component and a small amount per delivery, to only paying per 
delivery. 
The movement from hourly rates to piece rate – or rather to an entirely 
piece rate arrangement – is a further method through which Deliveroo is 
shifting the risk of the business model onto workers. In the absence of 
physical supervision, Deliveroo has developed methods to encourage 
workers to make timely deliveries. The piece rate means that workers can 
measure the relationship between their own performance and pay: the more 
they deliver over a shift, the more money they make. However, this also 
relies on enough demand from customers – something which mainly comes 
over mealtimes, rather than evenly spread over the day. In addition to the 
numbers of deliveries made, workers also receive an email (at the point of 
the interviews it was every two weeks) with work performance statistics. As 
Kendall explained, ‘so I get this email that tells me… time to the restaurant, 
to the customer, at the customer’. However, he continued: 
I don’t even get the actual numbers, I get my distance from the mean and 
whether or not I met their criteria. So I get this email that is like: good job you 
met all the criteria and you were five minutes faster than average. The first 
month I like missed the criteria of time at the customer, which I thought was 
weird, but nothing happened. If you had no penalties yeah, you don’t have to 
show up, there’s no penalty. Like they send you the email for self-motivation, 
I don’t know, SDSA they call it, so here’s a bunch of information, changes of 
my Service Delivery Standards Assessment, so that they did give me my 
average, time to the restaurant. So average difference was 2.8, but they didn’t 
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actually give me my real time. Travel to customer, -3.4, time at customer, they 
don’t tell me, they just tell me they matched it.  
The new possibilities offered by this level of surveillance is impressive. It is 
comparable to methods developed in call centres, in which (as noted earlier) 
it became ‘feasible to attain total knowledge, in “real time”, of how every 
employee’s time was being deployed, through the application of electronic 
monitoring equipment’ (Bain et al. 2002: 3). This possibility is now extended 
at Deliveroo through the smartphone, GPS technology, and greatly increased 
bandwidth. It is also, like in the factory and the call centre, combined with a 
piece-rate system. 
This aspect of Deliveroo is particularly important for understanding how the 
work is managed. Unlike many other kinds of service work in London, there 
is almost no contact with the company or managers. Conor explained the 
difference as this: ‘there’s no supervisor standing over your shoulder, no one 
checking up on you and coming over to talk, it’s really different’. In order to 
understand how a workplace – in this case dispersed over numerous zones 
across London – can be successfully organised and managed, it is necessary 
to consider how technology and techniques are experienced by workers at 
Deliveroo. The app-based organisation of the labour process allows 
Deliveroo to collect fine-grain data on the performance of workers. While 
workers are signed in to the app they are tracked by GPS and each stage of 
the order is timed and logged. The technology provides ‘a real-time “God’s 
eye-view” of workers currently logged in’, as Facility argued, involved a 
perspective of ‘watching the city from directly above, viewing the abstracted 
“units” as they move around the terrain, and displaying live data flows of 
various kinds’ (Waters and Woodcock, 2017). The information created by the 
technology is not shared with the workers, leading to an information 
asymmetry which is becoming a common feature of platform work (Heeks, 
2017: 17). It was this that led Facility to self-track and attempt to overcome 
this asymmetry (Waters and Woodcock, 2017).  
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The illusion of control at Deliveroo 
The labour process at Deliveroo is clearly precisely timed and measured. 
While these kinds of methods were developed extensively in call centres, at 
Deliveroo this is now happening outside of a physical workplace. Each action 
that the worker takes is meticulous logged and compared through the 
software platform, another example of what Cederström and Fleming (2012: 
38) have called ‘exposure capitalism’, where ‘everything about us is suddenly 
on display – to be seen, to be judged’. In other contexts, algorithms have 
been used to ‘seduce, coerce, discipline, regulate and control: to guide and 
reshape how people, animals and objects interact with and pass through 
various systems’ (Kitchin, 2017: 19). This is also the case at Deliveroo. As 
Mumit explains, at Deliveroo ‘it’s the algorithm that’s the boss’, 
automatically collecting and comparing data across the entire company. 
Mumit continues: ‘the algorithm has rules and we’re the ones who, knowing 
that, the guys in the office are data driven, and we’re the ones who make the 
data’.  
For the worker, the information is only relayed in the form of ‘a progress 
report and it gives you a list and it breaks down how long it taking you to do 
each of your things’, which Fred explains includes time to get to accept the 
order, travel to the restaurant, collect the food, deliver to the customer, time 
taken at customer, and so on. Fred further notes: 
the thing that’s really interesting, is they don’t tell you what the average that 
they’re looking for is, they just say ‘you’re achieving’ or ‘you’re not achieving 
it’ but they don’t tell you, they don’t say ‘you’re under thirteen minutes’, they 
say ‘your time is twelve and a half minutes, which is you know, achieving 
better than the target’ but they won’t say what the target is, it’s just you’re 
doing it quick enough, but you’re not, but its definitely like obscurity is part 
of the motivating thing, like if you don’t really know then you just have to 
keep going faster.  
This is an important feature of the Deliveroo platform. However, as Sam 
explains, ‘when you fail it just says like, ‘you haven’t met the expectations’, 
there is no consequence, there is no anything’. Each of the interviewees 
noted that there were very few, if any, direct disciplinary results for 
performance. At one stage Ben had been told there was ‘a three strike rule’, 
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although in their case this had never been acted upon. There was a general 
confusion amongst participants about how the process worked, and Sam also 
explained ‘things like this keep changing, like the payment structure too, 
and it’ll change again soon I’m sure’. However, later Deliveroo would 
introduce waves of ‘deactivations’, firing people for what workers presumed 
was falling into the lowest performing categories. 
To make sense of this it is useful to return to Fernie and Metcalf’s (1997: 3) 
metaphor of the ‘electronic panopticon’. The key difference at Deliveroo is 
that there is no physical presence of supervisors or managers to enact 
decisions based on the data. Instead, Deliveroo automates much of the 
management of the labour process, sending emails to drivers rather than 
calling them into meetings. This creates what can be conceptualised as an 
algorithmic panopticon (Pasquinelli, 2015) at Deliveroo (Waters and 
Woodcock, 2017). The algorithmic panopticon is, like the architectural 
model, ‘sustained by another appearance, one that is not the effect of 
reality, but that is itself a fiction’ (Božovič, 1995: 8). Not only has Deliveroo 
attempted to contractually outsource workers, but the actual supervision 
and management of the labour process is automated. This is not outsourced 
in the same way as it is within the platform, but involves supervisors no 
longer being employed in the same way. The efficacy of this approach relies 
upon the social power of algorithms: there is evidence of detailed 
supervision in the emails to workers, and discipline is enforced with 
occasional ‘deactivations’. 
The process of measurement is combined with the piece-rate system to 
provide the illusion of control at Deliveroo. This illusion is an attempt to 
inculcate workers with the imperatives of management. Unlike the factory or 
the call centre, the supervisor is no longer present, removing the physical 
aspect. Control goes beyond just the supervision of workers to ensure that 
they are working effectively. Control is also about overcoming worker 
resistance. Yet, the strikes at Deliveroo have shown that the algorithmic 
panopticon is not effective at all for dealing with wildcat strike action. The 
idea of an algorithmic panopticon does not ‘disavow the possibilities for 
collective organisation and resistance’ (Taylor and Bain, 1999: 103), which 
was a concern during the call centre debates. This can be seen clearly with 
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the instances of strike action from 2016 at Deliveroo. In response to a 
change in payment terms, a demonstration was organised outside of the 
Deliveroo headquarters in central London. Drivers were able to take strike 
action over the course of the next few days by logging out of the Deliveroo 
app. The precarity of their own employment conditions allowed the wildcat 
strike action to spread incredibly quickly, with no need to adhere to the 
regulations restricting trade union action in the UK. In a sign of their own 
precarity, Deliveroo backed down from their original plans that sparked the 
action, opting instead to trial the new rate in a particular zone. In the factory 
or the call centre, supervisors would be on hand to deal with strike action. 
Without any effective disciplinary apparatus, Deliveroo had almost no tools 
at its disposal to manage the strike action. This also hints at the possibility 
that there is more resistance happening below the surface of both the 
researcher and managerial gaze. 
Outside of strike action, the illusion holds Deliveroo together as an effective 
organisation. It works just well enough to keep the platform operating. 
However, the points of rupture highlight that Deliveroo, like other 
platforms, is involved in a twofold precarity: forcing workers into precarity, 
while operating precariously as a lean platform itself. This illusion of control 
can be partly explained by the emphasis of data collection by platforms, but 
also due to the lean model with pressure on costs (Srnicek, 2017). The data 
collected at Deliveroo is not just used to send out automated performance 
emails. As Agre (1994: 107) pointed out, privacy can be considered in terms 
of surveillance (as it often has) or as capture. This capture model ‘has deep 
roots in the practical application of computer systems’ and goes further than 
observation to acquire and dissect data on individuals. It can also be found 
in more forms of work, as data collection and metrics become increasingly 
widely used (Woodcock, 2018). At Deliveroo, this extends to the installation 
of proprietary software on rider’s smartphones, allowing the vast capture of 
data. Deliveroo’s algorithmic panopticon can also be conceived as operating 
within a broader ‘surveillance assemblage’ (Haggerty and Ericson, 2000: 611) 
of both worker and customer. This data is intended to develop the future 
business models of Deliveroo, stretching from the dark kitchens (where food 
is prepared only for deliveries, see Facility and Woodcock, 2017), automated 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  22(3) 
88 | article 
food delivery, and the prediction and shaping of food consumption patterns 
(Panja, 2018). 
The algorithmic panopticon has not solved the problem of the 
indeterminacy of labour power for Deliveroo. The longer term aims of 
Deliveroo, like Uber, lies in the collection of data. For now, the model at 
Deliveroo requires two interrelated illusions. The first is the illusion of 
control discussed here. The second is an illusion of freedom. As Fred 
explained, working at Deliveroo is ‘actually like a reasonable shit job because 
that illusion of freedom is really strong like you do kind of feel like your own 
boss because we can all stand around and talk shit about Deliveroo as much 
as we like’ because ‘you don’t have that sort of spectacle of authority’. The 
difference with Deliveroo’s algorithmic panopticon is this lack of direct 
disciplinary action. In the factory, supervision was direct and carried risk of 
disciplinary action, while in the call centre workers had regular meetings 
with supervisors to discuss their performance – and could be fired on the 
spot (Woodcock, 2017: 43). The panopticon requires ‘punishment’ as a 
‘spectacle’ to support the supposed omnipresence of the inspector (Božovic,̌ 
1995: 4). Instead, Deliveroo entrusts the automated performance emails to 
convince workers. In the process, workers find a form of freedom within this. 
However, it is an ‘illusion of freedom’, as Fred notes, because in the end, 
workers do not have control. For example, there is no way to dispute a 
‘deactivation’ or challenge the data that has been collected. 
Conclusion 
This article aimed to understand Deliveroo from the perspective of workers. 
The use of workers’ inquiry methods allowed an experimental look at how 
management through algorithms, conceptualised here as an algorithmic 
panopticon, is carried out in practice. Rather than focusing attention on the 
algorithm itself, the article places this within the development of different 
forms of measurement and control at work. This historical trend is an 
important corrective to the risk that complex algorithms are overestimated, 
either in practice or theoretically, and then appear as a perfect supervisory 
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tool, becoming like the observer in the panopticon. The correction to this is 
a return to the workers’ perspective. 
Throughout the article, the role of measurement has been considered. First, 
through an examination of the factory and the classical panopticon, the call 
centre and the electronic panopticon, and then at Deliveroo with the 
algorithmic panopticon. Each of these instances had different ways of 
enacting surveillance and measuring work – with piece rates, disciplining, 
and other methods to try and overcome the indeterminacy of the labour 
process. However, measurement alone is never enough within the 
contradictory context of the workplace. At Deliveroo, the algorithmic 
panopticon goes beyond measurement, but without physical supervision, it 
relies upon the illusions of control and freedom. However, like in the factory 
and call centre before, the practice of this management approach is not 
without problems. Workers discover these through their engagement with 
the labour process. The precarious employment conditions also represent a 
potential lowering of the barriers to resistance and struggle, seen with the 
wildcat strikes at Deliveroo in 2016. Precarity is therefore twofold at 
Deliveroo: both precarious working conditions for workers, as well as a 
precarious operation for the platform. 
The appearance of an omnipresent and automatic method of supervising and 
disciplining workers is a cost-effective method of control, but as the 
participants indicated, this appearance was far from total. It is also 
important to note that the participants expressed a positive experience of 
the illusion of freedom created by the algorithmic panopticon, along with 
the ability to work outside of a formal workplace, whether on a bicycle or 
moped/motorbike. The illusion of freedom provided an important mobilising 
factor for the organising campaign that followed. The business model of 
Deliveroo, like that of Uber, has so far proven effective and is being applied – 
either in part or completely – to an increasingly greater range of sectors. The 
early success of Deliveroo workers to organise, along with the support of the 
IWGB, provides an important example of how workers can resist in these 
new contexts. Further research is needed to understand the factors that led 
to the strike action and trace the lines of struggle that are emerging in the 
gig economy. The strikes show that the power of the algorithmic panopticon 
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is not totalising. Instead, it is one part of what Foucault (2012) would have 
called an ‘archipelago of different powers.’ Thus, the streets of London, like 
the factory floor and the call centres before that, remain a ‘contested terrain’ 
(Edwards 1979: 15), in which workers continue to come into conflict with 
their employers – whether via an algorithm or not. 
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